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Abstract
We examine Kreps’ (2019) conjecture that optimal expected utility in the classic
Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) economy is the limit of optimal expected utility for a
sequence of discrete-time economies that “approach” the BSM economy in a natural
sense: The nth discrete-time economy is generated by a scaled n-step random walk,
based on an unscaled random variable ζ with mean zero, variance one, and bounded
support. We confirm Kreps’ conjecture if the consumer’s utility function U has
asymptotic elasticity strictly less than one, and we provide a counterexample to
the conjecture for a utility function U with asymptotic elasticity equal to 1, for ζ
such that E[ζ3] > 0.
1 Introduction
Fix a random variable ζ with mean zero, variance one, and bounded support. For n =
1, 2, . . ., construct a financial-market economy with two securities, a riskless bond, which
serves as numeraire (hence, has interest rate 0) and a risky security, called the stock, which
trades against the bond in frictionless markets at time 0, 1/n, 2/n, . . . , (n − 1)/n. The
price process for the stock is generated as follows: For an i.i.d. sequence {ζj; j = 1, 2, . . .},
where each ζk has the distribution of ζ, the law for the price of the stock at time k/n is
S(k/n) := eξ(k/n) where ξ(k/n) :=
k∑
j=1
ζj√
n
.
(ξ(0) ≡ 0 and S(0) ≡ 1.) At time 1, the bond pays a consumption dividend of 1, and the
stock pays a consumption dividend of S(1) defined as above.
Embed this model into the standard state space Ω = C0[0, 1]. Let ω denote a generic
element of Ω, with ω(t) the value of ω at time t. Endow Ω with the sup-norm topology;
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let F denote the Borel σ-field, and let {Ft; t ∈ [0, 1]} denote the standard filtration on
Ω. For each n, let Pn be the probability measure on Ω such that the joint distribution
of (ω(0), ω(1/n), . . . , ω(1)) matches the distribution of (ξ(0), ξ(1/n), . . . , ξ(1)), and such
that ω(t) for k/n < t < (k + 1)/n is the linear interpolate of ω(k/n) and ω((k + 1)/n).
And let S : Ω→ R+ be defined by S(ω, t) = eω(t).
Donsker’s Theorem tells us that Pn ⇒ P , where P is Wiener measure on C0[0, 1];
that is, ω under P is a standard Brownian motion, starting at ω(0) = 0, and S(ω) under
P is geometric Brownian motion, so that P , together with the riskless bond, prescribes
the simple continuous-time economy of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973)
(hereafter, the BSM economy or model).
We imagine an expected-utility-maximizing consumer who is endowed with initial
wealth x, with which she purchases an initial portfolio of stock and bond. Thereafter,
she trades in non-anticipatory and self-financing fashion in the stock and bond (that is,
(a) the information she possesses at time k/n, on which basis she trades, is [only] the
history of the stock price up to and including time k/n, and (b) any purchase of stock after
time 0 is financed by the sale of bonds, and the proceeds of any sale of stock are invested
in bonds), seeking to maximize the expectation of a utility function U : (0,∞) → R
applied to the final dividend generated by the portfolio she holds at time 1.
The question that forms the basis for this paper is: If we place this consumer
in the nth discrete-time economy (where the stock and bond trade (only) at times
0, 1/n, 2/n, . . . , (n − 1)/n), does the optimal expected utility she can attain approach,
as n→∞, what she can optimally attain in the continuous-time BSM economy?
Let un(x) be the supremal expected utility she can attain in the nth discrete-time
economy if her initial wealth is x, and let u(x) be her supremal expected utility in
the BSM economy. Kreps (2019) obtains partial one-sided results about how limn un(x)
compares with u(x): lim infn un(x) ≥ u(x). But, except in special cases (for instance, if U
has constant absolute or relative risk aversion), the other “half,” or lim supn un(x) ≤ u(x),
has only been conjectured to be true.
We show here that Kreps’ conjecture holds for a fairly wide class of utility functions,
although we show as well cases in which the conjecture fails.
Our analysis is based in very large part on ideas and results in Kramkov and Schacher-
mayer (1999), which we abbreviate throughout as [KS], citing specific results by writing,
for instance, [KS, Theorem 2.0].
2 The utility function, its conjugate function, and
asymptotic elasticity
We always assume the following:
Assumption (2.1). The utility function U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
continuously differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions that limx→0 U ′(x) =∞ and
limx→∞ U ′(x) = 0. Moreover, without loss of generality and for notational convenience
later, we assume unless otherwise specified that U is normalized so that limx→∞ U(x) > 0,
without precluding the possibility that limx→∞ U(x) =∞. (Of course, limx→0 U(x) can be
either finite or −∞.)
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We let V denote the conjugate function to U : For y > 0,
V (y) = sup
x>0
[
U(x)− xy], for y > 0.
The following results are standard and follow from Assumption (2.1):
• Let I : (0,∞) → (0,∞) be the inverse of U ′; that is, I(y) = (U ′)−1(y). Then for
every y ∈ (0,∞), V (y) = U(I(y))− yI(y).
• The function y → V (y) is strictly convex, continuously differentiable, and strictly
decreasing.
• V (∞) = U(0) and V (0) = U(∞), where the values of U and V at 0 and ∞ are
interpreted as the limits as x and y approach 0 and ∞, respectively.
• From V (y) = U(I(y)) − yI(y) (and assuming enough smoothness so that I is
differentiable) we have V ′(y) = U ′(I(y))I ′(y) − I ′(y)y − I(y) = yI ′(y) − I ′(y)y −
I(y) = −I(y). In fact, V ′(y) = −I(y) in general, which implies that limy→0 V ′(y) =
−∞ and limy→∞ V ′(y) = 0.
Finally, U(x) = infy>0
[
V (y) + xy], for x > 0.
The notion of asymptotic elasticity of U , defined in [KS], plays an important role
in our analysis. For the utility function U , its asymptotic elasticity, written AE(U), is
defined by
AE(U) := lim sup
x→∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
If, for instance, U(x) = xα/α for α ∈ (0, 1), then AE(U) = α.
The concavity of U implies that AE(U) ≤ 1 in all cases; if U is bounded above and
if U(∞) > 0, then AE(U) = 0. But if U(∞) = ∞, AE(U) can equal 1; an example is
where U(x) = x/ ln(x) for sufficiently large x.1
Many of our results depend on the assumption that AE(U) < 1, which derives from
a comparison of the average and marginal utilities provided by U as the argument of U
approaches ∞: AE(U) < 1 is equivalent to:
For some γ < 1, U ′(x) < γ
U(x)
x
, for all large enough x.
The economic interpretation of this condition can be sharpened if we think of the con-
sumer comparing her marginal utility from very large consumption levels with the average
utility she has accrued over some base level x0. Because
lim
x→∞
U(x)− U(x0)
x− x0 = limx→∞
U(x)
x
, for all x0 > 0,
AE(U) < 1 is equivalently:
For some γ < 1 and every x0>0, U
′(x) < γ
U(x)− U(x0)
x− x0 , for all large enough x,
1The conditions (2.1) on U include limx→∞ U(x) > 0; this is solely so that AE(U) ≥ 0 in all cases.
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where “large enough” depends on the value of x0.
As noted in Schachermayer (2004), the concept of asymptotic elasticity connects to
the limiting behavior of relative risk aversion as follows: If the limit of the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, limx→∞−xU ′′(x)/U ′(x), exists and is strictly positive, then
limx→∞ xU ′(x)/U(x) exists and is less than 1; that is, U has asymptotic elasticity less
than 1. Since it is believed to be “common” for economic agents to have non-increasing
relative risk aversion, this belief implies that agents with this common property have
asymptotic elasticity less than one.
3 Solutions for the continuous-time economy
As is well known, the continuous-time BSM economy admits a unique equivalent martin-
gale measure denoted by P∗; that is, a probability measure on Ω that is probabilistically
equivalent to P and such that {S(ω, t); t ∈ [0, 1]} is a martingale (over the natural fil-
tration {Ft}). This measure P∗ has Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to P given
by (
dP∗
dP
)
(ω) = exp
(
− ω(1)
2
− 1
8
)
.
And, as is well known, this economy has “complete markets.” That is, the consumer
can construct (as a stochastic integral) any measurable positive contingent claim X that
she can afford, where what she can afford X is given by the single budget constraint
EP∗ [X] ≤ x, where EP∗ [·] denotes expectation with respect to P∗. Hence, with wealth x,
the consumer’s problem is to
Maximize EP [U(X)], subject to EP∗ [X] ≤ x.
Let
u(x) := sup
{
EP [U(X)] : EP∗ [X] ≤ x
}
.
That is, u(x) is the supremum of expected-utility level that the consumer can achieve in
the BSM economy, starting with wealth x.
It is convenient for later purposes to define the density function Z : C0[0, 1]→ (0,∞)
by
Z(ω) := exp
(
− ω(1)
2
− 1
8
)
.
That is, Z is the unique continuous (in ω) version of dP∗/dP . Of course, EP∗[X] =
EP [X · Z] for any random variable X such that (at least) one of the expectations makes
sense. And, in this notation u(x) = sup
{
EP [U(X)] : EP [X · Z] ≤ x}.
We have the following from Cox and Huang, (1989), Karatzas, Lehoczy, and Shreve
(1987), and [KS]. (See, in particular, [KS, Theorem 2.0].)
3.1. u(x) ≥ U(x) (since the consumer can always buy and hold x bonds).
3.2. x→ u(x) is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave.
3.3. From 3.1 and 3.2, if u(x0) <∞ for any x0 > 0, then u(x) <∞ for all x > 0.
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3.4. If u(x) <∞, and if the consumer’s problem has a solution (that is, if the supremum
is attained), then there exists y(x) > 0 such that the solution has the form X(ω) =
I
(
y(x) · Z(ω)), where y(x) = u′(x) and (as noted earlier) I = (U ′)−1.
If the consumer’s problem has a solution at wealth level x > 0, then it has a
solution for all wealth levels x′ > 0 such that x′ < x.
However, it is possible that, at least for some x, u(x) <∞ and yet the supremum
that defines u(x) is not attained by any contingent claim X. (An example is given
in [KS, Section 5]; we produce examples below.) If (for the given utility function
U) this is true for some finite x, let x be the infimum of all x for which there is no
solution (but u(x) < ∞); there is a solution at x, and so the range of x for which
there is a solution is the interval (0, x].
The function x → u(x) is continuously differentiable and the “Lagrange multi-
plier function” x→ y(x) = u′(x) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (0, x).
3.5. Let v be the conjugate function to u. That is,
v(y) = sup{u(x)− xy : x > 0}, for y > 0.
Then
v(y) = EP
[
V
(
yZ
)]
.
The function y → v(y) is convex and nonincreasing, and it is strictly decreasing
and continuously differentiable where it is finite.
Of course, it may be that u(x) ≡ ∞, in which case v(y) ≡ ∞. But suppose u(x) <∞
for some, and therefore for all, x > 0. While u(x) is necessarily concave, differentiable,
and strictly increasing, it is not in general true that limx→∞ u′(x) = 0. That is, the
marginal (maximal expected) utility of wealth need not approach zero as the wealth level
goes to∞. Roughly speaking, this can happen when a consumer can purchase ever larger
amounts of consumption on events of ever smaller probability, but where the ratio of the
amount purchased to the probability of the event approaches infinity at a rapid enough
rate. This idea was exploited by [KS] for any utility function U that satisfies AE(U) = 1,
by choosing, based on U , specific measures that are different from but play an analogous
role to P∗ and P . Here, P∗ and P are fixed – they come from BSM – so we show this
sort of possibility through the selection of specific utility functions U .
Admitting this is possible (we show that it is), consider the implications for v and, in
particular, for v around the value y0, where y0 = limx→∞ u′(x). To the left of y0 (y < y0),
we have v(y) = ∞. To the right, v(y) is finite. But what is the limiting behavior of
v as y approaches y0 from the right? In theory, we could have limy↘y0 v(y) = ∞. Or
limy↘y0 v(y) <∞, and limy↘y0 v′(y) =∞. Or limy↘y0 v(y) <∞, and limy↘y0 v′(y) <∞.
All of these are possible. In fact, giving the full catalog, we have Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. Assume that U satisfies the conditions (2.1). It is possible that u(x) =∞
(for all x ≥ 0). But if u(x) <∞ for some x, hence for all x, it must be that x→ u(x) is
strictly increasing. Moreover, we have the following possibilities.
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a. For some utility functions U , limx→∞ u′(x) = 0, in which case v(y) is finite for all
y > 0. (Since limy→0 v(y) = limx→∞ u(x) and limy→∞ v(y) = limx→0 u(x), the
function v can have limit ∞ or a finite limit as y approaches 0; and v can have
limit −∞ or a finite limit as y →∞.
b. For other utility functions U , limx→∞ u′(x) > 0. If we denote limx→∞ u′(x) by y0,
then v(y) =∞ for y < y0, while v(y) <∞ for y > y0. As for the behavior of v as
y ↘ y0, we have the following possibilities:
i. limy↘y0 v(y) =∞
ii. limy↘y0 v(y) <∞ and limy↘y0 v′(y) =∞;
iii. limy↘y0 v(y) <∞ and limy↘y0 v′(y) <∞.
Moreover, all are possible for any value of y0 > 0.
c. AE(u) ≤ AE(U); hence, AE(U) < 1 implies limx→∞ u′(x) = 0. That is, asymptotic
elasticity less than 1 removes the cases given by part b.
The possibility outlined in part a is simple to show: Take utility functions with
constant relative risk aversion, for which solutions are well known and fit case a. And
part c needs no proof; it derives from [KS, Theorem 2.2]. To give examples of the three
possibilities outlined in part b requires some calculations. Since this is a diversion from
our main message, we leave this to Section 9.
4 Discrete time is asymptotically no worse than con-
tinuous time
Proposition 2. For the sequence of discrete-time economies as described in Section 1,
and a utility function U that satisfies conditions (2.1),
lim inf
n→∞
un(x) ≥ u(x) for all x > 0.
Note: If u(x) =∞, this proposition still applies, implying that limn→∞ un(x) =∞.
Proof. Kreps (2019, Proposition 5.2) states that if, in the BSM economy, a bounded
and continuous contingent claim X satisfies EP [U(X)] = z and EP∗ [X] = x (so that
u(x) ≥ z), then for every  > 0, there exists N such that, for all n > N , the consumer
in the nth discrete-time economy can synthesize a claim Xn for an initial investment of
x such that EPn [U(Xn)] ≥ z − .2
2The proof of this proposition relies on Theorem 1 in Kreps and Schachermayer (2019), which says
that any bounded and continuous contingent claim x can be approximately synthesized with bounded
risk in the nth discrete-time economy for large enough n, where “approximately synthesized” means:
For given  > 0 and large enough n (depending on ), the synthesized claim, xn satisfies Pn
(|xn −
x| > ) <  for arbitrary  > 0; and “bounded risk” means that the synthesized claim xn satisfies
xn(ω) ∈
(
infω′ x(ω
′), supω′ x(ω
′)
)
with Pn-probability 1.
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Suppose we know that u(x) < ∞ and, for the given x, a solution to the consumer’s
problem exists (that is, the sup that defines u(x) is a max). We then know, since the
solution is of the form X = I(yZ) for some multiplier y > 0 (see (3.4) above), that the
solution X : Ω → (0,∞) is a continuous function of ω. By truncating the solution X,
we get approximately u(x), with what is a bounded and continuous claim. Hence, we
conclude that
lim inf
n
un(x) ≥ u(x).
The cases where u(x) <∞ but no solution exists and where u(x) =∞ are a bit more
delicate, because we don’t know, a priori, that we approach the upper bound (finite in
the first case, ∞ in the second) with bounded and continuous contingent claims. But we
can show this is so. Suppose for some level z, there is a measurable contingent claim X
such that EP [U(X)] = z and EP∗ [X] = x. In this context, of course X ≥ 0.
Fix  > 0. We first replace X with a bounded claim X ′, bounded away from ∞
above and away from 0 below, in two steps. First, for α < 1 but close to 1, let Xα :=
αX + (1 − α)x. Of course, EP∗ [Xα] = x. And by a double application of monotone
convergence (split EP [U(Xα)] into EP [U(Xα)1{Xα≥x}] + EP [U(Xα)1{Xα<x}]), we have
limα→1 EP [U(Xα)] = EP [U(X)] = z. So choose αo close enough to 1 so that EP [U(Xα)] ≥
z−/4. Of course, Xα is bounded below by (1−α)x. As for the upper bound, cap Xαo at
some large β. That is, let Xα
o,β be Xα
o ∧ β. For large enough βo, this is bounded above
and will satisfy EP [U(Xα
o,βo ] > z − /2, while capping Xαo can only relax the budget
constraint.
So, it is wlog to assume that our original X (that gives expected utility z and satisfies
the budget constraint for x) is bounded above and bounded away from zero. Now apply a
combination of Luzin’s Theorem and Tietze’s Extension Theorem: We can approximate
X with a continuous function X ′ that differs from X on a set of arbitrarily small measure
and that satsifies the same upper and lower bounds as X; this allows the choice of X ′ to
satisfy EP [U(X ′)] > z − 3/4. It may be that EP∗ [X ′] > x, but the last /4 is used to
replace X ′ with X ′ − (EP∗ [X ′] − x), giving a bounded and continuous contingent claim
that costs x (or less) and provides expected utility z − , at which point Kreps (2019,
Proposition 5.2) can be applied to prove (in general) Proposition 2.
5 The “relaxed” problem
For the nth discrete-time economy, the consumer faces three types of constraints:
1. She has a level of initial wealth x, and her initial portfolio cannot exceed x in value.
2. Between times 0 and 1, any trades she makes must be self-financing.
3. She has available only the trades that the price process permits. In a word, her
final consumption bundle must be a synthesizable contingent claim.
The import of 3 is that, for ζ having support with more than two elements, the consumer
does not face “complete markets.”
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However, we know that any final consumption bundle X that she constructs subject
to these three constraints must satisfy
EQ∗n [X] = x,
where EQ∗n denotes expectation with respect to any probability measure Q
∗
n that is an
equivalent martingale measure (emm) for Pn.3
We fix one particular emm for each Pn, namely the emm, which we hereafter denote
by P∗n, provided by the Esscher transform:(
dP∗n
dPn
)
(ω) = exp
[− anω(1)− bn]
for constants an and bn, chosen such that P∗n is a martingale probability measure. Specif-
ically, an is fixed by the “martingale equation” that
EPn
[
dP∗n
dPn e
ω((k+1)/n)
∣∣∣∣Fk/n] = eω(k/n),
and bn is then fixed as a normalizing constant, given the value of an. Moreover, it can
be shown that an = 1/2 +
E[ζ3]
24
√
n
+ o(1/
√
n) where E[ζ3] is the third moment of ζ, and
that limn bn = 1/8. (The notation E[·] is used to denote expectations over ζ.) Of course,
Pn ⇒ P (weakly on C0[0, 1] endowed with the sup-norm topology) and, for this specific
equivalent martingale measure, P∗n ⇒ P∗.4
So, suppose we pose the following problem for the consumer:
Maximize EPn [U(X)], subject to EP∗n [X] = x, (5.1)
where EPn [·] denotes expectation with respect to Pn and EP∗n [·] denotes expectation with
respect to the specific emm P∗n. In words, we allow the consumer any consumption
claim X she wishes to purchase, subject only to the constraint that she can afford X at
the “prices” given by dP∗n/dPn.
Let Zn be the function on C0[0, 1] given by Zn(ω) = exp
[ − anω(1) − bn]. Hence,
Zn is a specific version of dP∗n/dPn and the constraint EP∗n [X] = x can be rewritten
EPn [ZnX] = x. That is, we can think simply of a consumer facing complete markets with
Zn the “pricing kernel” for contingent claims. Using this interpretation, we denote the
supremal utility the consumer can obtain in the problem (4.1) as
uZnn (x) := sup
{
EPn [U(X)], subject to EPn [ZnX] ≤ x
}
. (5.2)
The point of this is that the problem (5.1) relaxes the constraints that actually face
the consumer in the nth discrete-time economy; in (5.1) she faces“complete markets”; in
her real problem, she faces further “synthesizability” constraints. Hence, we know that
uZnn (x) ≥ un(x) for all x > 0 and n = 1, 2, . . . (5.3)
If we can show that limn u
Zn
n (x) = u(x), we will know that lim supn un(x) ≤ u(x). This,
together with Proposition 2, will establish that limn un(x) = u(x). So this is what we set
out to do.
3Because we assume that ζ has mean zero and variance one, we know that Pn admits emms.
4For a detailed derivation, see Kreps, 2019, Lemma 5.1.
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6 An analogous problem
In fact, we add one more plot element. Recall that Z is the function Z(ω) = exp(−ω(1)/2−
1/8), which is a version (the unique continuous version) of dP∗/dP . Define
uZn (x) = sup
{
EPn [U(X)] : EPn [ZX] ≤ x
}
. (6.1)
In words, uZn (x) is the supremal expected utility that the consumer can attain if she faces
complete markets and “prices” Z in the nth discrete-time economy. That is, moving from
the consumer’s problem in the BSM model to the problem described by (6.1) changes the
consumer’s probability assessment from P to Pn but not the “prices” she faces. In moving
from (6.1) to (5.2), we keep the probability assessment as Pn but change the prices from
Z to Zn. This “taking it one step at a time” is useful in the analysis to follow.
7 If asymptotic elasticity is less than 1, optimal ex-
pected utilities are finite and converge
In this section, we prove the following result:
Theorem 1. Suppose that the utility function U satisfies conditions (2.1) and that AE(U) <
1. Then, for all x > 0, the value function x→ u(x) is finite-valued and
lim
n→∞
un(x) = u(x). (7.1)
The proof of Theorem 1 will take several steps and consumes this entire section. We
begin with a lemma.
Lemma 1. For any constant γ, limn→∞ EPn
[
exp(γω(1)
]
= EP
[
exp(γω(1))
]
.
Proof of Lemma 1. Under Pn, ω(1) =
∑n
k=1 ζk/
√
n for {ζk} an i.i.d. sequence of
random variables with the law of ζ. Hence,
EPn
[
exp(γω(1))
]
= EPn
[
exp
(
γ
n∑
k=1
ζk√
n
)]
=
(
E
[
exp
(
γ
ζ√
n
)])n
.
A Taylor series approximation to exp(γζ/
√
n) is 1+γζ/(
√
n)+γ2ζ2/(2n)+o(1/n), where
the o(1/n) term is uniform in the value of ζ because ζ has bounded support. Therefore,
EPn
[
exp(γω(1))
]
=
(
E
[
1 +
γζ√
n
+
γ2ζ2
2n
+ o(1/n)
])n
=
(
1 + γ2/(2n) + o(1/n)
)n
.
The term on the rhs converges to eγ
2/2, which is (of course) EP
[
exp(γω(1))
]
.
Now we turn to the proof of Theorem 1:
Step 1. Because AE(U) < 1, u(x) <∞ for all x > 0.
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This step rates a remark: For “general” price processes as investigated, for instance,
in [KS], having asymptotic elasticity less than 1 does not guarantee that the optimal
expected utility is finite. The result here strongly depends on the price processes being
given by the BSM model.
The second key to Theorem 1 is the following bound:
There exist L > 0 and α > 0 such that V (y) ≤ Ly−α, for all y ∈ (0,∞). (7.2)
[KS, Corollary 6.1] establishes this bound as a consequence of AE(U) < 1, but only for
0 < y ≤ y0, for some y0 > 0. If we have that V (∞) = U(0) < 0, we get the bound for all
y > 0. And, for purposes of this theorem, it is without loss of generality to shift U by a
constant. So if U(0) ≥ 0, simply replace U with U(x)−U(0)− c, for a suitable constant
c > 0. Then we have, and henceforth assume, (7.2) for all y ∈ (0,∞).
Hence, we may estimate
v(y) = EP
[
V
(
y
dP ∗
dP
)]
≤ LEP
[
y−α exp
(
− ω(1)
2
− 1
8
)−α]
= Ly−αeα/8 E
[
exp
(
α
2
ω(1)
)]
<∞,
(7.3)
as the latter expectation is just an exponential moment of a Gaussian variable. Hence, by
[KS Theorem 2.0], the dual value function y → v(y) as well as the primal value function
x → u(x) have finite values; and we deduce as well from part c of Proposition 1, that
AE(u) ≤ AE(U) < 1.
Step 2. Using the notion (6.1), define uZ∞(x) for x > 0 by
uZ∞(x) := lim sup
n→∞
uZn (x). (7.4)
Then uZ∞(x) <∞ for all x > 0.
Define for each n the conjugate function vZn , which is
vZn (y) = EPn [V (yZ)]. (7.5)
By the same argument that gave (7.3), we have
vZn (y) = EPn
[
V
(
yZ
)] ≤ Ly−α eα/8 EPn[exp(α2ω(1)
)]
. (7.3′)
Lemma 1 tells us that the expectation on the rhs of (7.3′) converges, which implies that
vZn (y) is uniformly bounded in n for fixed y, which, by standard arguments concerning
conjugate functions, proves that uZ∞(x) is finite for each x.
Step 3. Indeed, limn u
Z
n (x) exists and equals u(x) for all x > 0.
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We show that limn v
Z
n (y) = v(y) for all y > 0, which proves step 3, again using standard
arguments concerning conjugate functions.
Compare vZn (y) and v(y):
vZn (y) = EPn [V (yZ)] and v(y) = EP [V (yZ)].
If V were a bounded function (of course, V is continuous), the conclusion would follow
immediately from Pn ⇒ P . But V is typically not bounded, and so we must show that
the contributions to the expectations from the “tails” can be uniformly controlled. We
do this by showing the following two uniform bounds:
For every y > 0 and  > 0, there existsM > 0 such that
EPn
[|V (yZ)| · 1{V (yZ)<−M}] < , uniformly in n. (7.7)
For every y > 0 and  > 0, there existsM > 0 such that
EPn
[
V (yZ) · 1{V (yZ)>M}
]
< , uniformly in n.
(7.8)
Begin with (7.7). If U(0) is finite, it follows that V (y) ≥ V (∞) = U(0) for all y, so
taking M = −U(0) immediately works. The (slightly) harder case is where U(0) = −∞.
In this case, recall that, by the Inada conditions, limy→∞ V ′(y) = − limy→∞(U ′)−1(y) = 0.
Since V is convex, this implies that for large enough M , |V (y)| ≤ y, provided V (y) ≤
−M . But then
EPn
[∣∣V (yZ)∣∣ · 1{V (yZ)≤−M}] ≤ EPn[Z] ≤ EPn[Z]. (7.9)
By Lemma 1, limn→∞ EPn [Z] = EP [Z] = 1, which shows (7.7).
And to show the (uniform) inequality (7.8): For the parameters α and L that give the
bound (7.2) and for fixed y > 0 and  > 0, let B be large enough so that
EPn
[
eαω(1)/2 · 1{ω(1)≥B}
] ≤ 
Ly−α eα/8
for all n. (7.10a)
The existence of such a B follows from Lemma 1 and, because Pn ⇒ P ,
(1) EPn
[
min{eαω(1), B}] → EP[min{eαω(1), B}] and (2) Pn({ω(1) ≥ B}) →
P({ω(1) ≥ B}), for all B > 0. And let
M = Ly−α exp
(
αB
2
+
α
8
)
. (7.10b)
We have V (y) ≤ Ly−α for all y > 0, and so{
V (yZ) ≥M} ⊆ {L(yZ)−α ≥M} = {L(yZ)−α ≥ Ly−α eαB/2+α/8)}
=
{
Z−α ≥ eαB/2+α/8} = {(e−ω(1)/2−1/8)−α ≥ eαB/2+α/8}
=
{
eαω(1)/2 ≥ eαB/2} = {ω(1) ≥ B}.
11
Hence,
EPn
[
V (yZ) · 1{V (yZ)≥M}
] ≤ EPn[L(yZ)−α · 1{ω(1)≥B}]
= EPn
[
Ly−α(e−ω(1)/2−1/8)−α · 1{ω(1)≥B}
]
= Ly−αeα/8EPn [eαω(1)/2 · 1{ω(1)≥B}
] ≤ ,
uniformly in n.
Having shown the two uniform bounds (7.7) and (7.8), what remains is a standard
argument. Fix y and  both > 0, and find M such that (7.7) and (7.8) both hold.
Let V M(yZ) := max
{−M,min{M,V (yZ)}}; that is, V M(yZ) is V (yZ) “truncated” at
±M . This truncated function is bounded and continuous, so Pn ⇒ P implies EPn [V M ]→
E[V M ]. And the differences EPn [V (yZ)−V M(yZ)] are uniformly bounded by 2. Hence,
vn(y) = EPn [V (yZ)]→ EP [V (yZ)] = v(y) for all y, which implies that uZn (x)→ u(x) for
all x > 0.
Step 4. For every y > 0 and  > 0, there exists M > 0 such that
EPn
[|V (yZn)| · 1{V (yZn)<−M}] < , uniformly in n. (7.11)
The parallel to the uniform inequality (7.7) is obvious: (7.7) uniformly controls the right-
hand tail of the integral vZn (y) = EPn [V (yZ)]; here we are uniformly controlling the
right-hand tail of the integral vZnn (y) = EPn [V (yZn)]. And the same proof works; indeed,
in this case we even have EPn [Zn] = 1 (as opposed to EPn [Z]→ 1 before).
Step 5. There is a constant C > 1 such that, for all n,
1
C
≤ Zn(ω)
Z(ω)
≤ C,Pn − a.s. (7.12)
(The reason for this step is to prove a uniform bound for EPn
[
V (yZn)
]
analogous to (7.8),
which is Step 6.)
We have that
Zn(ω)
Z(ω)
=
e−anω(1)−bn
e−ω(1)/2−1/8
,
where an = 1/2 + d/
√
n+ o(1/
√
n), where d = E[ζ3]/24, and bn = 1/8 + o(1). Hence,
Zn(ω)
Z(ω)
= exp
[
dω(1)√
n
+ ω(1) · o
(
1√
n
)
+ o(1)
]
.
Since ζ has bounded support, there is some constant K such that |ζ| ≤ K with probability
1, and so |ω(1)| ≤ K√n, Pn-a.s. The ability to find a constant C > 1 that gives (7.12)
is now evident.
Step 6. For every y > 0 and  > 0, there exists M > 0 such that
EPn
[
V (yZn) · 1{V (yZn)>M}
]
< , uniformly in n. (7.13)
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Rewrite the left-hand inequality in (7.12) as Z(ω)/C ≤ Zn(ω), on the support of Pn.
Since V is a decreasing function, this implies that, for all y > 0,
V (yZ(ω)/C) ≥ V (yZn(ω)) and, therefore,{
V (yZ(ω)/C) > M
} ⊇ {V (yZn(ω)) > M},
both restricted to the support of Pn. Therefore, for any M > 0,
EPn
[
V (yZn) · 1{V (yZn)>M}
] ≤ EPn[V (yZ(ω)/C) · 1{V (yZ(ω)/C)>M}].
But then the proof of the existence of M such that (7.8) is satisfied can be applied to
y′ = y/C, which completes this step.
Step 7. For all y > 0,
lim
n
∣∣EPn [V (yZn)]− EPn [V (yZ)]∣∣ = 0.
The argument for this step changes a bit when V (0) = U(∞) and/or V (∞) = U(0)
are finite valued. So we first give the argument in the case where V (0) = U(∞) = ∞
and V (∞) = U(0) = −∞, and then sketch how to handle the easier cases where one or
the other is finite.
Fix  > 0 and y > 0, and pick M > 0 large enough so that (7.7), (7.8), (7.11),
and (7.13) all hold. Let M ′ = M + 2. Let w1 and w2 be the solutions, respectively,
to V (yZ(w1)) = M
′ and V (yZ(w2)) = −M ′, where by Z(w), we temporarily mean
exp(−w/2 − 1/8). This implies that if ω is such that ω(1) ∈ [w1, w2], then V (yZ(ω)) ∈
[−M ′,M ′]. Moreover, by the continuity and monotonicity of V , Z, and Zn (the latter two
viewed as functions of ω(1)), and the fact that for fixed w, Zn(w) → Z(w), there exists
n0 such that for all n > n0, ω(1) ∈ [w1, w2] implies that V (yZn(ω)) ∈ [−M − 1,M + 1].
The functions V , Z, and Zn are all uniformly and even Lipschitz continuous on compact
domains (for V , that are strictly bounded away from 0), so there is a Lipschitz constant
` such that ∣∣V (yZn(w))− V (yZ(w))∣∣ ≤ ` · ∣∣Zn(w)− Z(w)∣∣,
if n > n0 and w ∈ [w1, w2]. And, on the event ω(1) ∈ [w1, w2], there is n1 such that for
all n > n1, |Zn(ω)− Z(ω)| < /`.
Hence, on the event D = {ω(1) ∈ [w1, w2]}, and for n > max{n0, n1}, we have
|V (yZ(ω))−V (yZn(ω))| ≤ , and EPn
[|V (yZ(ω))−V (yZn(ω))|·1D] < . By construction,
the complement of D is a subset of the union of the four events on which we have
uniformly controlled the integrals of V (yZ(ω)) and V (yZn(ω)), so for n > max{n0, n1},
EPn
[|V (yZ(ω))− V (yZn(ω))] < 5, uniformly in n, which proves Step 7.
When V (0) and/or V (∞) are finite, the argument needs a bit of modification. Suppose
V (0) < ∞. This is relevant when yZ and yZn are both close to zero, which is for paths
ω where ω(1) is large. And for those paths, Zn(ω) can be quite far from Z(ω). However
even if these terms are far apart, V (yZ(ω)) and V (yZn(ω)) will be close together, since
each is close to the finite V (0). A similar argument works for cases where V (∞) is finite.
Step 8. Combine Steps 7 and 3 to conclude that limn→∞ uZnn = u(z) for all z > 0.
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Step 3 shows that vZn (y)→ v(y) for all y > 0 (which is how we concluded that uZn (x)→
u(x)). Step 7 then implies that vZnn (y) → v(y) for all y > 0. This, in turn, implies
limn→∞ uZnn (x)→ u(x) by standard arguments on conjugate functions.
Step 9. Combine Steps 8 and Proposition 2 to finish the proof.
The argument has already been given.
This proof clarifies why we introduced the analogous problem, where a consumer with
probability assessment Pn faces complete markets and prices given by Z: Comparing
this with the BSM model, the conjugates vn and v to optimal expected utility functions
un and u are the expectations of a fixed function for different probability measures. So,
after controlling the tails of the integrals that define these conjugate functions, we have a
more or less standard consequence-of-weak-convergence result in Step 3. In Step 7, both
the probability assessments and the prices (for one of the two problems being compared)
change with n. While the pairs of problems being compared differ only in the prices,
because both the integrand and the integrating measure Pn change with n, a level of
finicky care is required.
8 A counterexample to Kreps’ conjecture
Theorem 1 guarantees that for utility functions U that satisfy the conditions (2.1) and
have asymptotic elasticity less than one, everything works out nicely within the context
of the BSM model and the discrete-time approximations to BSM that we have posited.
It is natural to ask, then, what can be said if we maintain (2.1) and these specific
models of the financial markets, but we look at utility functions U for which AE(U) = 1.
In such cases, it may be that things work out in the sense of Theorem 1. But it is also
possible that lim supn→∞ un(x) > u(x). That is, when AE(U) = 1, Kreps’ conjecture can
fail. In this section, we provide an example to illustrate this failure in stark fashion: In
this example, u(x) <∞ while lim supn→∞ un(x) =∞, both for all x > 0.
In this example (and also in Section 9, where we finish the proof of Proposition 1), we
construct conjugate functions V taking the form
V (y) :=
∞∑
k=1
βky
−αk ,
where αk, βk > 0 and the sequences {αk} and {βk} are chosen so that the sum defining
V (y) is finite for all y > 0.
We begin with some standard facts about conjugate pairs U and V , when V has the
form V (y) = βy−α.
Lemma 2. For α > 0 and β > 0, denote by Vα,β(y) the function Vα,β(y) := βy
−α for
y > 0. For the utility function Uα,β that is conjucate to Vα,β, if x0 = −V ′α,β(y0) = βαy−α−10
for given y0, then
Uα,β(x0) = (1 + α)Vα,β(y0). (8.1)
The resulting utility function Uα,β is
Uα,β(x) =
1 + α
αα/(1+α)
β1/(1+α)xα/(1+α), for x > 0.
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Since α > 0, α/(1 + α) ∈ (0, 1), and AE(Uα,β) = α/(1 + α) < 1.
Lemma 3 provides some analysis of the consumer’s maximization problem in the con-
text of the BSM model, when the conjugate to her utility function has the form Vα,β.
Lemma 3. Imagine a consumer in the BSM economy whose utility function Uα,β is given
by (8.1). The (dual) value function corresponding to Uα,β and Vα,β in the BSM economy
is
vα,β(y) = EP
[
Vα,β
(
yZ
)]
= βe(α
2+α)/8y−α = e(α
2+α)/8Vα,β(y). (8.2a)
And the primal expected-utility function, giving the supremal expected utility that the
consumer can achieve in the BSM economy as a function of her initial wealth x, is
uα,β(x) = e
α/8Uα,β(x). (8.2b)
Proof. Equation (8.2b) is easily derived from (8.2a), so we only give the proof of (8.2a).
Let Y beN(0, 1)-distributed so that Y −1/8,1/4 = −Y/2−1/8 has the law of ln(dP∗/dP) =
ln(Z). Hence, the random variable
[
y exp(−Y/2 − 1/8)]−α has the law of Vα(y Z), and
so
vα,β(y) = EP
[(
βy exp
(−Y
2
− 1
8
))−α]
= βy−αeα/8EP
[
exp
(
αY
2
)]
= βe(α+α
2)/8y−α.
The factor e(α+α
2)/8 recurs occasionally, so to save on keystrokes, let φ(α) := e(α+α
2)/8.
Denote by Lζ(λ) the Laplace transform of the law of ζ; that is
Lζ(λ) := E[exp(λζ)].
As above, denote by Y a standard (mean 0, variance 1) Normal variate and write
LY (λ) := E[exp(λY )] = eλ2/2.
Letting Yn be the scaled sum of n independent copies of ζ,
Yn =
ζ1 + . . .+ ζn
n1/2
,
we have
LYn(λ) = Lζ
(
λ
n1/2
)n
.
The Central Limit Theorem corresponds to the well known fact that LYn(λ) converges to
LY (λ). On the other hand, if E[ζ3] > 0, by taking a Taylor series expansion of exp(λY )
around 0 for small λ, it follows that, for some λ0 > 0,
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Lζ(λ0) > LY (λ0). (8.3)
Now consider a conjugate utility function Vα,β(y) = βy
−α as above, its conjugate
Uα,β, the corresponding value functions for the BSM economy uα,β and its conjugate
vα,β, as in Lemma 3, which we compare to the value functions for the various discrete-
time economies where the consumer faces complete markets and prices given by Zn. In
this section, we do not require value functions for discrete-time economies in which the
consumer faces prices Z, so to simplify notation, in this section we write vnα,β for the
conjugate-to-the-value-function for the nth discrete-time economy — that is,
vnα,β(y) := EPn
[
β
(
yZn
)−α]
for all y > 0. (8.4)
And we write unα,β to denote that primal value function (the conjugate to v
n
α,β).
Consider, for integer k, the ratio vnα,β(k)/vα,β(1/k). From (8.2a) and (8.4), it is evident
that this ratio is independent of the value of β, and so, for integers k and n, and α > 0
(and any β > 0), let
M(k, n, α) :=
vnα,β(k)
vα,β(1/k)
. (8.5)
Lemma 4. For each integer k, there exists n large enough so that, for α := 2λ0n
1/2,
M(k, n, α) ≥ 22k.
Proof. Fix k. Without loss of generality, set β = 1. For given n and α = 2λ0n
1/2,
calculate the denominator and numerator in the M(k, n, α) separately.
For the denominator, we have
vα,1
(
1
k
)
= EP
[(
1
k
exp
(
− ω(1)
2
− 1
8
))−α]
=
(
1
k
)−1/α
eα/8EP
[
λ0n
1/2ω(1)
]
=
(
1
k
)−α
eα/8E
[
exp(λ0n
1/2Y )
]
=
(
1
k
)−α
eα/8 LY (λ0n1/2)
=
(
1
k
)−α
eα/8 (eλ
2
0/2)n =
(
1
k
)−α
eα/8 LY (λ0)n,
where Y is a standard (mean 0, variance 1) Normal variate.
And for the numerator, which we calculate for general y and β before specializing to
y = k and β = 1:
vnα,β(y) = EPn
[
β(yZn)
−α] = EPn[β(y exp(−anω(1)− bn))−α]
= βy−αeαbn E
[
exp
(
2λ0ann
1/2
(
ζ1
n1/2
+ . . .+
ζn
n1/2
)]
= βy−αeαbn
(
E
[
exp(2anλ0ζ)
])n
= βy−αeαbnLζ(2anλ0)n
= y−αH(nα, β) for H(n, α, β) := βeαbnLζ(2anλ0)n,
(8.6)
where the ζj’s are i.i.d. copies of ζ.
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We therefore have that
M(k, n, α) =
vα,1
n(k)
vα,1(1/k)
=
k−αeαbn
(Lζ(2anλ0))n
(1/k)−αeα/8
(LY (λ0))n
=
[
k−2λ0 e2λ0(bn−1/8)
]n1/2[Lζ(2anλ0)
LY (λ0)
]n
.
(8.7)
The term within the first square brackets on the rhs of (8.7) has a finite limit (since
bn → 1/8), so as n→∞, this term, raised to the power n1/2 is bounded above by Gn1/2
for some constant G. And the term within the second set of square brackets converges
to Lζ(λ0)/LY (λ0), which, per (8.3), is a constant strictly greater than 1. This term is
raised to the power n. Hence, for fixed k, the second term overwhelms the first term for
large enough n, proving Lemma 4.
For each k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,, let nk and αk = 2λ0n
1/2
k be the values of n and α guaranteed
by Lemma 4. That is, for each k (and for all β > 0),
M(k, nk, αk) =
vnkαk,βk(k)
vαk,βk(1/k)
> 22k. (8.8)
It is clear that we can add the requirements that nk ≥ k and nk/k is increasing, and we
do so. Since αk = 2λ0n
1/2
k , this implies that limk→∞ αk =∞.
Let
βk :=
1
2kvα,1(1/k)
so that βk vαk,1(1/k) = vαk,βk(1/k) =
1
2k
. (8.9a)
By (8.8),
vnkαk,βk(k)
2kvαk,βk(1/k)
= vnkαk,βk(k) > 2
k. (8.9b)
Define
V (y) :=
∞∑
k=1
βky
−αk =
∞∑
k=1
Vαk,βk(y), for all y > 0. (8.9c)
Clearly, the sum is well defined for all y > 0, and the function has all the properties
required to be conjugate to a utility function U that satisfies Condition (2.1).5 Indeed,
(8.9a) ensures that
v(y) = EP
[
V
(
yZ)
)]
= EP
[ ∞∑
k=1
Vαk,βk(yZ)
]
=
∞∑
k=1
vαk,βk(y) <∞, for all y > 0,
which implies that, for U the conjugate (utility) function to V , and for u the (maximal
expected) utility-of-wealth function corresponding to this U within the BSM economy,
u(x) <∞ for all x.
5It may be worth pointing out, however, that this utility function U is not
∑
k Uαk,βk .
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Concerning the discrete-time economies, begin by noting that all the terms in the sum
(8.9c) are positive, so Vαk,βk(y) ≤ V (y). This implies that, for each k,
vnkαk,βk(y) ≤ vnk(y) for all y, and therefore unkαk,βk(x) ≤ unk(x) for all x > 0. (8.10)
Now we enlist Lemma 2. Using the notation from (8.6), for arbitrary yk > 0, let
xk := −
(
dvnkαk,βk
dy
)
(yk) = αk y
−αk−1
k H(nk, αk, βk) =
αk
yk
· vnkαk,βk
(
yk
)
.
Lemma 2 tells us that
unkαk,βk(xk) = v
nk
αk,βk
(
yk
)(
1 + αk
)
.
Hence,
unkαk,βk(xk)
xk
=
(
1 + αk
)
vnkαk,βk(yk)(
αk/yk)v
nk
αk,βk
(yk)
=
1 + αk
αk
yk > yk. (8.11)
Choose yk = k
1/2. Since vnkαk,βk(k) > 2
k and vnkαk,βk(y) is decreasing in y, we know that
vnkαk,βk
(
k1/2
)
> 2k. Since αk = 2λ0n
1/2
k and nk/k is, by construction, nondecreasing, we
know that αk/k
1/2 is nondecreasing. Putting these two observations together, we know
that
lim
k→∞
xk = lim
k→∞
αk
k1/2
· vnkαk,βk
(
k1/2
)
=∞. (8.12)
And, for this choice of yk, (8.11) tells us that
lim
k→∞
unkαk,βk(xk)
xk
= lim
k→∞
1 + αk
αk
k1/2 =∞. (8.13)
Each function unkαk,βk is concave and has value 0 at x = 0. So (8.12) implies that, over
the interval x ∈ (0, xk], unkαk,βk(x) > k1/2x. Hence, from (8.10), the same is true for unk(x).
But as k increases toward ∞, the intervals [0, xk] over which this is true expand to all
of (0,∞] — this is (8.12) — and the underestimate of unk on this interval approaches
infinity. This implies that
lim
k→∞
unk(x) =∞, for all x > 0. (8.14)
The limit established in (8.14) doesn’t quite accomplish what we set out to do. We
want to show that, in the nth discrete-time economy, where the consumer faces prices Zn
and the constraint that she must be above to synthesize her consumption claim, she can
(at least, along a subsequence) asymptotically generate infinite expected utility, although
she can only generate finite expected utility in the BSM economy. The limit in (8.14)
concerns what expected utility she can generate facing prices Zn and complete markets.
But this final step is easy. The properties of ζ that are used to get to (8.13) (in contrast
to the finiteness of supremal expected utility in the limit BSM economy) are (1) ζ has
mean zero, (2) ζ has variance 1, (3) ζ has finite support, and (4) E[ζ3] > 0. So suppose
ζ is the asymmetric binomial
ζ =
{
2, with probability 1/5, and
−1/2, with with probability 4/5.
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It is straightforward to verify that all four required properties are satisfied. And, since
ζ has two-element support, for any n, it gives complete markets. For this asymmetric
binomial ζ, unk(x) is precisely what she can attain in the nkth discrete-time economy,
even with the synthesizability constraint imposed.
We therefore have the desired counterexample to Kreps’ conjecture.
We come to the same conclusion for any asymmetric binomial with mean zero and an
“uptick” greater in absolute value than the “downtick,” as this gives E[ζ3] > 0.6 It is
natural to ask, then, what happens in the case of the symmetric binomial, where ζ = ±1,
each with probability 1/2 or, more generally, for any asymmetric binomial with E[ζ3] ≤ 0
or, even more generally, any ζ with mean zero, bounded support, and E[ζ3] ≤ 0.
For such ζ, the above reasoning does not apply. To the contrary, in the specific case
of the symmetric random walk, we have
Lζ(λ) = cosh(λ) ≤ eλ2/2 = LY (λ), for all λ ∈ R. (8.15)
This is most easily seen by comparing the Taylor series
cosh(λ) =
∞∑
k=0
λ2k
(2k) !
versus eλ
2/2 =
∞∑
k=0
(λ2/2)k
k !
=
∞∑
k=0
λ2k
2kk !
.
Hence, the logic of the counterexample constructed above, which requires Lζ(λ0) >
LY (λ0) for some λ0 > 0, fails.
It may still be true for the symmetric binomial that lim supn un(x) > u(x), for some
utility function U (necessarily, in view of Theorem 1, satisfying AE(U) = 1). Or it may
be that equality holds true, in the case of the symmetric binomial (and, perhaps, in the
case of all symmetric ζ or even ζ such that E[ζ3] ≤ 0). We leave this question open.
9 Proof of Proposition 1b
Because Z = dP∗/dP = e−ω(1)/2−1/8, the law of Z is that of exp(Y −1/8,1/4), where Y −1/8,1/4
is Normal variate with mean −1/8 and variance 1/4. By standard calculations, then, the
law of Z has density function
f(y) =
√
2
pi
1
y
exp
[
− 2
(
ln(y) +
1
8
)2]
.
Consider the function
V0(y) =
1
f(y)
=
√
pi
2
y exp
[
2
(
ln(y) +
1
8
)2]
. (9.1)
Differentiating V0 shows that it is decreasing in y as long as ln(y) < 3/8, and a
similiar computation shows that V0 is also convex on (0, z0) for small enough z0 > 0.
Hence, we may define a function V : R++ → R++ that coincides with V0 on the interval
(0, z0) and is extended to all of (0,∞) and that is convex, decreasing, differentiable, and
6Having a variance of 1 changes the formulas but not the basic conclusion.
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satisfies V ′(∞) = 0. The conjugate function to this V , denoted U , therefore satisfies the
conditions (1.1).
We want to determine the range of values of strictly positive y for which the value
function
v(y) = EP
[
V
(
y Z)
)]
(9.2)
is finite and for which values is it infinite. Clearly, this depends only on the small values of
Z = dP∗/dP . Write the expectation (9.2) over the interval where Z = dP∗/dP ∈ (0, z0)
as
EP
[
V
(
yZ(ω)
)
;Z(ω) ∈ (0, z0)
]
=
∫ z0
0
V0(yz)f(z)dz
=
∫ z0
0
1
f(yz)
f(z)dz =
1
y
∫ yz0
0
f(w/y)
f(w)
dw,
where the last step involves the change of variable w = yz.
By straightforward calculation, we find that
f(w/y)
f(y)
= Kw4 ln(y); hence, EP
[
V (yz);Z ∈ (0, z0)
]
=
∫ yz0
0
w4 ln(y)dw.
This integral diverges if 4 ln(y) ≤ −1; that is, if y ≤ e−1/4.
By the duality between u and v, this demonstrates, for y0 = e
−1/4, the possibility that
v(y) = ∞ for y ≤ y0 and is finite for y > y0; moreover, as y ↘ e−1/4 = y0, v(y) ↗ ∞.
This is possibility b(i) in Proposition 1. And to extend this result to a general y0 > 0, it
suffices to pass from the function V0(y) to
V y0(y) = V
(
e−1/4
y0
y
)
.
For possibility b(iii) in Proposition 1: Lemma 2 shows that
EP
[(
y Z
)−α]
= e(α
2+α)/8y−α.
Recall that φ(α) := e(α
2+α)/8. Begin by defining, for y > 0,
V (y) :=
∞∑
k=1
βky
−αk , (9.3)
where αk and βk are given by
αk = 2
k − 1 and βk = 1
2kαkφ(αk)
.
The sum (9.3) converges for all y > 0 and, in fact, does so faster than geometrically past
some k0 (that depends on y).
Moreover, it is evident that V is strictly positive, convex, and twice (and more) con-
tinuously differentiable. And from the lemma, we have that
v(y) = EP
[
V
(
y Z
)]
=
∞∑
k=1
βkEP
[(
y Z
)−αk] = ∞∑
k=1
βkφ(αk)y
−αk (9.4a)
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and v′(y) = −
∞∑
k=1
βkφ(αk)αky
−αk−1. (9.4b)
Substituting in the formulas for αk and βk, (9.4a) and (9.4b) become
v(y) =
∞∑
k=1
y−2
k+1
2k(2k − 1) and v
′(y) = −
∞∑
k=1
y−2
k
2k
. (9.5)
By inspection, v(y) = ∞ for y < 1 and is finite for y ≥ 1. And v′(y) is finite for y ≥ 1.
This, then, is the possibility b(iii) in Proposition 1, for y0 = 1.
We leave to the reader the construction of an example of possibility b(ii) and examples
where the pole is y0 6= 1.
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